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i.0 SUMMARY
%_nere were two investigative aspects associated with the loss of
the cryogenic oxygen tank pressure during the Apollo 13 flight. First,
what was the cause of the flight failure of cryogenic oxygen tank 2.
Second, what possible contributing factors during the sround history of
the tank could have led to the ultimate failure in flight.
° The first flight indication of a problem occurred when the quantity
measurement in the tank went full scale about 9 hours before the incident.
This condition in itself could not have contributed to ignition in the
tank, since the energy in the circuit is restricted to about 7 milli-
Joules.
Data from the electrical system provided the second indication of a
problem when the fans in tank 2 were activated to reduce any stratifica-
tion which might have been present in the supercritlcal oxygen in the
tank. Several short-circuits were detected and have been isolated to
the fan circuits of tank 2. The first short-circuit could have contained
as much as 160 Joules of energy, which is within the current-protection
level of the fan circults. Tests have shown that two orders of magnitude
less energy than this is sufficient to ignite the polytetrafluoroethylene
insulation on the fan circuits in the tank. Consequently, the evidence
indicates that the insulation on the fan wiring was ignited by the energy
in the short-circuit.
The b_rning in the tank then proceeded, causing the tank pressure
to rise to a pes_ value of 1008 psi, about half of the predicted tank
burst pressure a°6 cryogenic temperature. At that time the relief valve
; opened, as expected, and decreased the pressure in the tank. The burning
had progressed to the point by this time that all energized electrical
circuits to tank 2 had shorted and opened.
The next indication of a problem occurred when accelerome%er traces
in the command module showed vibration excitation with the largest ampli-
tude along the longitudinal axis. This was apparently at the time that
the integrity of tank 2 was lost and the vacuum dome relief plug blew
• out. The loss of tank pressure is concluded to have been caused by the
failure of the electrical conduit tube when the fire progressed into the
conduit. Tests under simulated conditions support this point of view.
_ The only place the wiring comes close to, or touches, the pressure vessel
is in the electrical conduit tubing at the top of the tank. To fail the
tank at any location other than the electrical conduit, without burning
metal inside, does not appear reasonable, particularly if only insulation
is burning in zero g.
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Following the rupture of the conduit tubing, the tank 2 pressure re-
mained above 880 psi to the point of data loss. If the tank pressure had
,_ecreased below 880 psi, the heaters would have come on automatically at
that time. The heater circuits were energized during the data loss period.
Consequently, the evidence supports the theory of a small opening in the
tank venting into the bay which housed the cryogenic tanks. A fraction
of a second after the conduit failed, the pressure immediately increased
in the bay mud blew the panel off. Thermal measurements show significant
heating was present Just before the psnel separated which indicated there
must have been an area burning exterior to the pressure vessel. A rup-
tured tank that was dumping cold fluid would have caused a chilling of
the temperature sensors. The data indicate that tank 2 remained in the
bay and photoanalysts using sophisticated methods, believe the photo-
graphs reveal that at least part of tank 2 remained intact.
Many aftereffects resulted from the loss of tank 2 pressure integ-
rity. Most significant were the eventual loss of tank 1 pressure and the °-
loss of electrical power from two of the three fuel cells when the shock
of the panel separating caused the oxygen supply valves to close. More
important, however, was the fact that the condition was undetected since
a warning is given to the crew only when both hydrogen and oxygen valves
to a fuel cell are closed_ Oxygen system 1 developed a leak either as ......
the result of shock when the panel separated, or from the dynamics of the
particular events associated with the failure of tank 2 electrical conduit.
The cryogenic oxygen tank 2 could not be off ]oaded after the initial _'
f'illing during the countdowndemonstration test. The problem resulted
from loose or misaligned plumbing components of the dog-leg portion of
the tank Fill path. Allowable manufacturing tolerances are such that the
tank may not be detanked normally. A test has verified this fact. The
condition of'loose plumbing in the probe assembly, which existed in the
tank befor_ the detanking, was judged to be safe for flight in every
aspect.
The inability to perform a normal detsmking operation during the
countdown demonstration test led to the use of a speclp.1 detanking pro-
cedure. The special detanking procedures failed the tank heater thermal i
switches ,o t_heclosed position. An incompatibility between the voltage
output of' ground power supply used for the heaters and the the.rmal switch
capacity resulted in fusing the contacts when operatin_ in this mode for
the first time. This resulted in continuous heater-on times in excess • I
of 8 hours, which went undetected prior to flight. This condition over-
heated the insulation, causing major electrical wire insulation degrada-
tion (splits and cracks). Several mechanisms could have moved the fan i
wiring and caused the shorted conditions which triggered the fire within
the tank and finally caused the loss of all service module oxygen. _
'i
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32_0-_INTRODUCTION
The main substance of the investigation of the cryogenic oxygen
tank 2 anomaly is contained in this report. Additional information con-
cerning the tank 2 manufacturing and checkout history, the details of
the analyses, and the results of the special tests conducted in support
of the investigation will be forwarded under separate cover.
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3.0 PERTINENT DATA
The significant system parameters for the period of interest are
shown in figure 3-1. Bay 4 of the service module and the hardware
mounted in this area are shown in figure 3-2.
Approximately 9 hours prior to the period of interest, the quantity
gage in cryogenic oxygen tank 2 failed to full scale during a fan cycle.
At 55:53:20, the electrical fan circuits for cryogenic oxygen tank 2
were energized. Approximately 2 seconds later, a momentary short was
indicated in the current from fuel cell 3. Within several seconds, two
other momentary shorted conditions occurred.
The cryogenic oxygen tank 2 pressure increased from 880 to 1008 psi
in approximately 90 seconds wi%h a plateau at 40 seconds. The pressure °i
then decreased to 995 psi in about 9 seconds. The fuel cell flow rates
responded to the pressure profile.
The-temperature in the tank rose rapidly during the final 25 sec-
onds of the pressure rise, then the measurement failed. The quantity -
gage, which had previously failed, corrected itself and then failed
again.
The command module accelerometers responded to a vibration disturb ..... _
ance about 420 milliseconds after the last pressure reading and to an
impulse about 340 milliseconds later. Approximately 40 milliseconds
l_ber, all data from the spacecraft were lost for about 1.8 seconds.
Following recovery of the data, the spacecraft had experienced a trans-
lation change of O.h ft/sec primarily in a plane normal to the cryogenic
oxygen tank bay. Cryogenic oxygen tank 2 pressure read zero. The cryo-
genic oxygen tank 1 pressure was decaying rapidly, and its heaters were
on. A main bus B undervoltage alarm and a computer restart were present.
Several structural temperatures in bays 3 and 4 were reading up to 8° F
higher than before the data loss.
The crew reported that they had heard and felt a sharp '_bang," coin-
cident with a computer restart and a master alarm associated with a main
bus B undervoltage condition. Within 20 seconds, a quick check of the ]
electrical parameters was made by the crew and all par_ueters appeared
normal. However, the crew did report the following barberpole indica-
tions:
a. Service module reaction control system helium i on quads B and D
b. Service module reaction control system helium 2 on quad D
c. Service module reaction control system secondary propellant
valves on quads A and C.
i.
00000001-TSB09
6
?Figure 3-2.- Arrangementof fuel cells andcryogenicsystemsIn bay 4. 'i
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About 2-1/2 minutes later, fuel cells i and 3 ceased generating
electrical power. About 2 hours later, fuel cell 2 was turned off as a
result of the pressure loss in cryogenic oxygen tank 1.
i Photographs taken after service module separation showed that the
bay 4 panel was missing and that one high-gain antenna horn was damaged.
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4.0 DATA ,ANALYSIS
This section analyzes the significant events relative to the inci-
dent involving cryogenic oxygen tank 2 and identified in sectio,, 3.0.
4.1 QUANTITY GAGE
The first anomalous inflight condition associated with the cryogenic
oxygen tank 2 occurred at 46:40:06 when the ac-powered destratification
fans in both cryogenic oxygen tanks were turned on. Within about 3 sec-
onds after fan activation, the quantity measurement for cryogenic oxygen
tank 2 abruptly indicated full-scale high. This system indicates density
of the cryogenic oxygen by measuring its dielectric constant, which is a
function of density. This instrument is a capacitor which consists of
two concentric aluminum tubes inside the tank (fig. 4-1).
Tests have shown that an open-clrcuit in the leads to the capacitor
assembly or a short across the capacitor or its leads will drive the out-
put to full scale. If this short-circuit is removed, the output signal
drops abruptly from full scale to zero, and then in about a second, it
settles out to the proper reading, as noted in the data of figure 4-2.
This agrees with the flight data from the quantity probe. Tests also
show that if the inner tube is shorted to ground, the output may oscil-
late in a random manner. Such an oscillation was noted several minutes
after data recovery following the incident. It should be noted that with
a short-circuit in the quantity gaging system inside the tank, the maxi-
mum current that could be drawn is 15 milliamperes.
4.2 ELECTRICAL SHORTS
The configuration of the electrical power system at the time of the
incident zs shown in figure 4-3, and the configuration of the electrical
power to the cryogenic oxygen tanks is shown in figure 4-4. As shown in
• fi_are 4-5, three separate shorting events occurred following application
of power to the fan circuits in cryogenic oxygen tank 2.
- The ac bus i voltage dropped 1.2 volts and the dc current increased
1.6 amperes when the cryogenic oxygen tank 1 fans were turned on
(fig. h-5).
About 1.5 seconds later, when the cryogenic oxygen tank 2 fans were
energized, the ac bus 2 voltage dropped 0.6 volt and the spacecraft cur-
rent increased 1.6 amperes. The thrust vector control gimbal command
-'4
_._ _......
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data from the stabilization and control system indicated a corresponding
voltage transient. Testing on the stabilization and control system has
shown that a low voltage transient on ac bus 2 results in a transient on
the gimbal command data. The ac bus 2 voltage decrease and the spacecraft
current increase show that power was applied to the cryogenic Jxygen
' tank 2 fans (fig. 4-5) but does not indicate whether the fan motors wer_
running, since the stall and running currents a_.e essentially the same.
The ac voltage decrease and the spacecraft current increase for the
fans in each tank were normal and agree with data from previous cryogenic
oxygen tank fan cycles. Also, the transient on the stabilization and
control system data appeared during previous tank fans cycles.
The first indication of a short on ac bus 2 appeared about 2-1/2 sec-
onds after activation of the cryogenic oxygen tank 2 fans. The ac bus 2
voltage dropped 1.2 volts, the fuel cell 3 current increased ii amperes
(fig. 4-5), and the stabilizat'on and control syztem gimbal command data
experienced a transient. Subsequent to the short, the spacecraft current
data show a decrease of 0.8 _,ere from the level just prior to the short.
Also, the ac bus 2 voltage started to toggle-up 0.6 volt, or one data bit
(fig. 4-5). These data indicate that a load was removed from ac bus 2
and that it was approximately one-half the load normally applied when the
cryogenic orggen tank 2 fans were turned on. This indicates that a short
in one of the two fan motor circuits in cryogenic oxygen tank 2 caused
its fuses to blow.
The second indication of shorting occurred about 15 seconds later
when phase A of ac bus 2 voltage increased 1.8 volts. Since the inverter
attempts to maintain a constant average 3-phase voltage, this increase in
phase A indicates a decrease on phase B or C of the ac bus 2 caused by an
_ncreased load.
Approximately 200 milliseconds later, the ac bus 2 voltage momen-
tarily decreased ll volts (fig. h-5), and the total spacecraft current
increased 3.5 amperes, indicating an increased load. After the momen-
tary decrease, the ac bus 2 voltage reading was 0.6 volt less than the
previous indication. This could be an indication that a single phase
short on phase B or C was removed by blowing a fuse.
About 20 seconds after the first short, the third ac bus 2 short
occurred. Fuel cell 3 current increased 23 amperes, and the stabiliza-
tion and control system data again indicated a transient (fig. 3-1).
Subsequently, the total spacecraft current level decreased to the same
level as it was prior to turning on the cryogenic oxygen tank 2 fans.
This indicates that power to the remaining cryogenic oxygen tank 2 fan
was removed by blowing its fuses due to this short. Also, the ac bus 2
voltage increased to the same level as that prior to turning the tank 2
fans on (flg. 4-5).
$
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The electrical energy that could not be accounted for by normal
spacecraft loads (fig. 4-5) is attributed to the shorts_ Calculations
were made of the maximum energy levels that could have been transmitted
through the circuit during these sho._ted conditions and that would still
meet the constraints imposed by the flight data resolution and sampling
times, _nverter performance, fuse clearing time, and dc and ac bus volt-
age sen_or performance. Inverter performance and fuse clearing time tests
were performed to provide data for the energy calculations. The energy
calculation_ are summarized in table h-I.
The spacecraft current data show that the heaters were not on prior
to the data loss. The heaters were set fGr automatic operation and the
cryogenic oxygen tank 2 pressure switch was open, thereby preventing
application of power to the heaters in either tank. In the automatic
mode, the heaters in both tanks are energized simultaneously when the
pressure switches for tanks 1 and 2 are closed (fig. 4-6). When data
were reacquired after the incldent, the spacecraft current indicated that ......
heaters in one of the cryogenic oxygen tanks had automatically been ener-
gized. For this to occur, the cryogenic oxygen tank 2 pressure must have
dropped below the switch actuation point during the data loss. The
tank 1 pressure was already below the switch actuation point. The cryo-
genic oxygen tank 1 heaters came on because they were the only operative
heaters when manually actuated later. The heaters use the same power
circuitry to the tanks during manual and automatic operation.
At about the time of the shock to the spacecraft, a master alarm
and a main bus B undervoltage light were noted coincident with a computer
restart. The voltage must decrease to below about 18 volts for at least
15 microseconds before a computer restart will occur. This event would
indicate a hard short on both main buses because the computer receives
its power, through diodes, from both buses. An undervoltage light on
main bus B only would be most probable because only one fuel cell supplies
its power, while bus A power is supplied by two fuel cells. The main bus
voltage must be below 26 volts for longer than 70 milliseconds for an
undervoltage indication to occur. The most likely cause of such a low
voltage for that length of time is a short on the wiring to the tank
pressure switches that control the heaters (fig. h-6), resulting from the
cryogenic oxygen tank failure. This circuit receives power from both
buses through lO-ampere fuses located in the service module. The short
must have occurred after closure of the pressure switches which provide
power to drive the motor switch, since the motor switch must close in
order to apply power to the tank heaters in the automatic heater control
mode. Cryogenic oxygen tank 2 heaters did not come on because the cir-
cuits were open.
00000001-TSC08
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TABLE h-l.- DELTA ENERGY CALCULATIONS
' AC AC
DC Time Total fault
current, level, Watts
amperes volts amperes _onst_'aints energy Joules
Single phase short
0.2 i15 23 1 13.6 sec 313
1.5 ill 167 9 (2) 200 ms 33
2.0 110 220 12 (2) 200 ms 44
2.5 109 273 14 (2) 200 ms 55
3.0 107 321 17 (i) 120 ms 39
4.0 105 420 23 (i) 31 ms 13
5.0 102 510 28 (1) 20 ms lO
7.0 95 666 36 (1) 10 ms 7
9,0 75 675 37 (1) 8ms 5 "-
12.0 4 48 13 (i) 4 ms 0.2
Two phase short
0.i 115 11.5 i 13.6 sec 313
1.5 iii 167 "14 (2) 200 ms 67 ....,
2.0 110 220 19 (2) 200 ms 88
2.5 109- 273 23 (2) 200 ms 109
3.0 107 321 28 (i) 120 ms 77
4.0 104 h16 36 (i) 31 ms 26
5.0 1o1 505 45 (l) 20 ms 20
7.o 80 560 58 (1) 1o ms 11
9.0 45 400 44 (l) 8 ms 6
Three phase short
0.07 115 7.7 1 13.6 sec 313
1.5 iii 167 22 (2) 200 ms i00
2.0 llO 220 31 (2) 200 ms 132
2.5 109 273 39 (2) 200 ms 164
3.0 107 321 47 (4) 70 ms 23
• 4.0 104 416 65 (i) 31 ms 39
5.0 i01 505 84 (i) 20 ms 31
7.0 90 630 105 (i) i0 ms 19
9.o 1o 90 25 (1) 8 ms 2 ,
!
.... III -- ....... I ill,i ..... I
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4.3 CRYOGENIC OXYGEN TANK 2 PRESSURE TRANSIENT
The interface of the cryogenic oxygen tank 2 with the oxygen system
is shown in figure 4-7.
The internal components of the tank and location of the wiring are
shown in figure 4-8. The oxygen temperature is measured from within the
tank as shown. Tank pressure is measured external to the tank in the
valve module (fig. 4-9) and is sampled once per second. _e pressure
switch which controls the automatic heater circuits is attached to the
valve module.
The electrical data show that power was applied to both fan motors
in cryogenic oxygen tank 2. It seems probable that one, and possibly
both, fan motors came on, but this cannot be determined conclusively from
the pressure data. Further, the electrical data confirm that the oxygen
tank heaters were not energized.
The time history of cryogenic oxygen tank 2 pressure variations dur- -
ing the last fan cycle can be divided into three regions (fig. 4-10).
The first region is the pressure rise which began Just after the fans
were turned on and lasted for 40 seconds, when a distinct change in the
pressure rise rate occurred.
The second region covers a 45-second time interval from the pressure .....',
plateau to the peak pressure of 1008 psia. The third region is character-
ized by about a 14-psia pressure drop over a 9-second period, after which
data were lost. A detailed discussion of the last 800 milliseconds before
data loss is presented in section 4.7.
4.3.1 Tank Pressure Data Analysis
Since the pressure transducer is located in a flow line and not on
the tank itself, an investigation was conducted to insure that the pres-
sure data are, in fact, a valid indication of pressure in the oxygen
tank.
Tests on the sensor in the system show that the sensor will respond
from zero to fUll scale in 5 milliseconds to a step input. The system,
including the plumbing, has a response of less than 30 milliseconds.
The transducer is located in the valve module (fig. 4-9), along with
the relief valve, and is about 20 feet of line length from the tank cavity
(fig. 4-7). The pressure measurement has been verified as representative
of the actual pressure in the tank in two tests under dynamic conditions I l
O0000001-TSC11
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with flow-througk the relief valve using simulated flight system hardware.
With high pressure gas, the measurement given by the transducer was within__
18 psi of the actual tank pressure. With cryogenic oxygen, the trans-
ducer reading was within 9 psi of the actual tank pressure.
l
Another validation of the pressure transducer under dynamic pressure
conditions consisted of integrating the flow rate change to the fuel cell
(fig. _-ii). This calculatien substantiated the tank pressure peak as
about 1008 psia. Throughout the mission, both tank pressures were read-
ing as expected, further substantiating their validity.
The pressure rise rates shown in figure _-i0 can be described ana-
lytically by various thermodynamic processes. All thermodynamic calcula-
tions on pressure rise, heat input, mass flow, etc. were performed using
data on the "real gas" properties. In the supercritical region, devia-
tions from ideal gas relationships can be extremely large.
The maximum energy input to satisfy the observed pressure rise is
a constant density heating process. This condition is shown by theupper
curve of figure 4-12. A second process, which establishes the minimum
energy input, is an isentropic compression of the fluid. This compression
is represented by all the energy input being confined to a small bubble,
which has no mass. The resulting thermodynamic state is one of higher
pressure in the tank. The result of this process is depicted by the lower
curve of figure 4-12.
In actuality, the ener_ input into the tank lies somewhere between
the maximum and minimum energy input curves shown in the figure. The
process is modeled by a hot oxygen bubble of constant uniform tempera-
. ture. growing at a rate sufficient to isentropically compress the sur-
rounding cryogenic oxygen. This formulation accounts for mass transfer
both to the hot mass (to increase the volume) e_d from the hot mass (tank
outflow). This mass transfer requires a larger energy input to sustain
the pressure rise. The center curve of figure 4-12 shows a comparison
of this model with the maximum and minimum energy models. The results
(fig. 4-13) s_e dependent upon the temperature of the hot mass. Note
that while the energy input increases by approximately 300 percent, the
hot mass volume changes only i0 percent. Therefore the energy source is
confined to a small region within the tank, and is essentially independ-
ent of the temperature of the burning material.
,J
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4.3.2 Region I and II Analysis
There are only two plausible mechanisms for the slope changes on
the pressure-time curve during regions I and II: a change in the mass
outflow characteristics or a change in the energy input characteristics.
Several analyses were performed in an attempt to relate changes in mass
outflow characteristics to the pressure curve. These studies show that
the only reasonable explanation for the observed pressure characteris-
tics is a rapidly changing combustion rate within the tank.
4.3.3 Region III Analysis
Region III is the portion of the pressure-time curve that is de-
creasing quite rapidly, from 1008 psla to 996 psia in about 9 seconds.
The analysis of the events in this time period must necessarily include
a discussion of the relief valve characteristics. The acceptance test
of this relief valve showed the valve started to open at 1004 psia and
was fully open at 1005 psia. The relief valve flow capability, which has -
been established by test, is much greater than the flow rate required to
produce the observed pressure decay in region III (fig. 4-1h). In fig-
ure 4-15, note that the relief valve has the capability to relieve the
pressure more rapidly than observed, even considering that the energy
input is increasing exponentially.
..."%,
There are at least two possible ways to explain the observed pres-
sure response. One is a partial restriction of the flow and the other
is a change in the combustion rate within the tank. There are several
conditions which could lead to partial restriction of the flow, but the
simplest of these is a restriction in the relief valve itself.
A change in the combustion rate could easily account for the slower-
than-expected pressure decay after the relief valve opened. In order to
properly account for the increase in combustion rate, it is necessary to
consider about the last 2 seconds of region II. At this point, the pres-
sure is 1004 psia, the relief valve crack pressure. When the relief
valve opens, the velocity at the filter (inside the oxygen tank) increases. _!
It is hypothesized that this increase in velocity provides both a convec-
tive force field and additional oxygen to the combustion source. When the
relief valve opens fully the local velocity increases to a maximum. A
further postulation is that this yields a maximum burning 'ate which raises
the pressure to 1008 psia. The relief valve flow then de_;eases the pres-
sure, although the combustion rate remains high. A heat input rate of
approximately 2 Btu/sec will raise the pressure from 1004 psia to 1008 psia
with the relief valve open. A constant heat rate of approximately 1-1/h
Btu/sec will match the observed pressure decay in region III (fig. 4-15).
This energy input rate is about two and one-half times larger than the
ewponential rate of region II.
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When data were recovered after the incident, the cryogenic oxygen
tank 2 pressure indication was at the lower limit, which means that either
the pressure at the transdmcer was, in fact, zero or that the measurement
had failed electrically. The pressure reading would go to zero if the
feedline__failed or the pressure in the tank was zero.
h.3.4 Cryogenic Oxygen Tank i Pressure Decay
An analysis was conducted to determine what hardware damage was re-
quired to explain the loss of oxygen from cryogenic oxygen tank 1. Fig-
ure 4-16 compares the cryogenic oxygen tank 1 pressure decay with the
pressure decay rate computed, assuming choked flow. Also, cross-plotted
on this figure are the integrated flow-rate curve and the quantity gage
'_ data. This latter curve tends to substantiate the analytical approach.
The analysis yields an effective flow area of approximately 0.005 In2.
This area is of the sam_ order as the line on the pressure switch; a
flow area this small could also result from a crimp in any of the lines
from cryogenic oxygen tank 1.
4.4 CRYOGENIC OXYGEN TANK 2 TEMPERATURE
While the pressure was rising sharply in cryogenic oxygen tank 2,
changes occurred in the temperature indication (fig. 4-10). The tempera ...... ,
ture data are obtained from a sensor located on the quantity probe assembly
(fig. h-8) within the tank. The temperature increased about 2° F during
_ the first pressure rise (region I). A temperature increase of this magni-
tude is in accord with that expected due to the pressure rise alone.
The significant aspect of the temperature data is the rapid rise
rate commencing approximately 2h seconds prior to loss of data (fig. 4-10).
Several analyses were performed to interpret the data. The results indi- _
cated that a temperature range of 600 ° to 2900 ° F could produce the ob-
served response. This wide temperature span is _ result of the geometric
configurations which are possible. The significant results from these !
• analyses confirmed that the combustion source was near the sensor during
the period of rapid temperature rise• Just prior to the loss of data,
the temperature dropped to zero, indicating an open circuit failure in ._
the measurement circuit. _
i
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h.5 PHOTOGRAPHIC ANALYSIS
4.5.1 Photographic Data
' The photographic data used in this analysis included onboard photog-
raphy of the service module taken by the crew after the service module
was separated from the command module. The onboard photography was of
marginal quality and included the following:
a. Twenty-six frsmes of 70-mm (magazine N) SO 368 Ektachrome MS
color film, using the Hasselblad hand-held camera with the 250-ram lens
b. Forty-three frames of 70-ram (magazine R) 3400 Panatomlc X black
and white film, using the Hasselblad hand-held camera with the 80-mm lens
c. Nineteen frames of 16-ram (magazine FF) SO 368 Ektachrcme MS color
film, using the hand-held motion picture camera with the 75-ram lens.
The average distance from the Hasselblad cameras to the service mod-
ule for the onboard photography was about 410 feet for magazine H and
about 880 feet for magazine N, resulting in_ an image scale of l:1500 and
1:1077, respectively. Of the frames showing the service module, orienta-
tion was such that the majority do not show bs_ 4, and at no time are the
sun angle and camera view simultaneously directed into bay h.
In an effort to draw detail out of the high density in the area of
the normal location of the cryogenic oxygen tank 2 in bs_v 4, two black
and white frames (AS13-59-8500 and -8501) and three color frames
(AS13-58-8462, -846h, and -8465) were subjected to photographic process-
ing enhancement for specific details. These same frames were also sub-
Jected to electronic scanning with an image digital construction tee-
nique similar to that used on the Surveyor lunar surface photography
Assisting the Photographic Technology Laboratory at the Manned Spacecraft
Center were the Jet Propulsion Laboratory, McDor_nell-Douglas Corporation,
LogEtronics Incorporated, Ciba Corporation, and Data Corporation with
their specialized techniques, facilities, and experienced personnel.
After exhausting all means of enhancement from the masters, the original
film was taken to Data Corporation, Dayton, Ohio, to be scanned with
their high-intensity, 1-micron probe and digitally reconstructed to bring
out the detail for analysis.
Without the benefit of sharp, well-lighted views of the bs_ 4 area, _
such as are available in the preflight closeout photographs, it was nec-
essary to obtain all the available information from each of the better
frames and then to combine the findings. This approach was also used in
examining the transparencies and prints of individual frames at each
stage of enlargement and enhancement.
i
I
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In addition, the contact and enlarged transparencies, combined with
the digitized enhancements : showed where the b_lar/Kapton was blocking,
or shadowing, to hide certain component areas. The information was re-
constructed into a scale model, which confirmed the presence of hard
, point components presenting different reflective surface, such as the
oxygen and hydrogen tank surfaces, as well as the influence of the Mylar/
Kapton highlights and blacks.
4.5.2 Onboard Photography Analysis
Figure 4-17a shows cryogenic oxygen tank 2 as it appeared at the
time of bay 4 closeout and figure 4-1To identifies the features shown.
Figure 4-18a shows frame 8464 of the 70-ram color film taken through
the window of the lunar module. Figure 4-18b identifies the principal
features. Figure 4-19a shows frame 8501 of the 70-n_J black and white
film and the principal features are identified in figure 4-19b.
Figure 4-20 shows the 1/6 scale model with fuel cells tipped, Mylar
and Kapton insulation extended, skin panel removed as in frame 8464, but
with a bright metal oxygen tank having a clean Inconel-type surface. Fig-
ure 4-21 shows the 1/6 scale model the same as in figure 4-20 except with
cryogenic oxygen tank 2 discolored brown. Figure 4-22 shows the same
1/6 scale model except with oxygen tank 2 removed. .:
Figure 4-18 and 4-19 are representative of the best onboard photog-
raphy analyzed by stereo plotter, monocular photographic interpretation,
enlarging and enhancement, elect1"onic scanning and digitizing, and by
model simulation. The results indicate the following:h
a. The fuel cells (1 and 3) are tipped slightly forward (outboard)
so the rear of the fuel cell shelf apparently was raised.
b. The insulation blanket was removed from the underside of the
fuel cell shelf near radial beam 3 and above oxygen tank 2, since the
color of the bare shelf is visible.
c. Mylar and Kapton insulation blown, torn, and/or partially burned
free from its initial fastening, now congest some areas of the bay and
extend outside the service module from several places along the edges of
shelves and beams.
I
d. The oxygen tank 2 appears to be present and discolored. Because
of the blackness of the non-illumlnated remaining interior, aluminized
Mylar and Kapton, and the dis.-._!orationof the oxygen tank 2, the bl_nd
.o,.
7- ._ •
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of brown.and black does not show on Photographic prints and is only dis-
cernible by subtle color change in the enhanced transparencies of frame
8_65 wh/c_ provides the most direct look into the unlighted area of the
oxygen tank in bay 4.
/
- e. The electrical cable to cryogenic oxygen tank 2 is identified
by its length and point of attachment to the oxygen shelf. The tank
attachment free end extends upwards and outwards from the shelf
(fig. _-19).
f. Reflections from the end domes, body, and some connections on
the hydrogen tank indicate it is apparently externally sound and in proper
position.
g. A portion of the bay 4 panel remained attached at the forward
end by radial beam 3, 8.ndthe lower access panel remained attached to
the service module at the aft end of beam 3.
h. One of the four reflectors and feeder horns for the hlgh-galn
antenna was damaged. The attitude of the antenna, with the damaged re-
flector nearest the service module, had changed since the incident be-
cause the gimbals are free to rotate whenever the power is turned off.
i i. The oxygen service panel appeared in its normal position, but
\ with considerable loosened M_lar and Kapton in the area.
:_ ,.
_ J. A brown stain was observed on the outside surface of the service
propulsion system engine nozzle ex_enslon, near the plus Z axis, and in
line with the vent path from the vent angulus around the nozzle.
4.5.3 Ground Photography
Three of the observatories tracking the spacecraft took photographs
of a nebulosity or cloud that appeared shortly after the incident.
Such a cloud, having a maximum measured diameter of 25 nautical
miles, appeared on a photograph from the Manned Spacecraft Center 16-inch
telescope at approximately 56 hours.
Analysis of a photograph taken through the telescope at Mount Kobau
0bse_-¢atory, British Columbia, at 58 hours 27 minutes, about 2-1/2 hours
after the incident, indicated that approximately 20 pounds of oxygen
would be required to form the observed cloud. The characteristics of
cloud shape and axes alignment indicate that it was not formed by an In-
stantaneous release of oxygen.
4
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(a) Cryogenicoxygentank2.
Figure4-17.- Bay4 closeoutphotography.
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(a) Onboardcameraview. _
Figure 4-19.- 70-mm black andwhitefilm frame8501.
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Figure4-20.- Modelwith lightingsimilarto onboardframe8464.
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(a) Lighting similar to onboardframe8464.
Figure 4-21.- Modelwith Incone!tanksurfacediscolored.
00000001-TSF11
44
...,.
(b) Bay 4 illuminated.
Figure 4-21.- Concluded.
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Figure 4-22.- Model wiUlout oxygen tank 2 and lighting similar to onboardframe ,9464.
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4.6 SERVICE MODULE BAY 4 PANEL SEPARATION
This section discusses the sequence of events immediately preceding,
during, and immediately following the separation of the outer shell panel
from bay 4 of the service module. A description of the associated struc-
ture and its failure mode is presented first, followed by a discussion
of the cryogenic oxygen tank 2 structure and how it might fail. Next,
the events occurring during the last second of data prior to the incident
are discussed.
_.6.1 Bay 4 Structural Description
Bay _ of the service module with the exterior shell panel removed,
is shown in figure 3-2. The exterior shell panel is bonded aluminum
honeycomb 1-inch thick; the exterior facesheet is 2024-T81 (O.020-inch
thick over most of the panel with a triangular section oi" 0.016-inch
thickness at the upper end), the interior facesheet is 7178-T6 (0.010- -.
, inch thick), and the perforated core is 5052-H39 (3/16 by 0.0007-inch,2.z lb/_3).
The panel has several smell doors, for servicing the tanks and fuel
cells located in bay 4, and one large door located in the lower left-hand
corner of the panel as viewed from the service module exterior. The
panel is fastened at the periphery by i/4-ineh bolts (NAS I134C) on approx-
imately 2-inch spacing and td the three shelves (fuel cell, o_/gen, and
hydrogen) by bolts at each shelf.
, Bay 4 is enclosed at the top by the 1-inch thick aluminum honeycomb
service module forward bulkhead and at the bottom by the 3-inch thick
aluminum honeycomb aft bulkhead. Radial beams 3 and 4 bound the left
and right sides of bay 4, respectively, as viewed from the service
module exterior. Bay 4 is open to the center tunnel except for three
areas. One O.032-inch sheet extends 18 inches from the forward bulkhead
and one 0.020-inch sheet extends between stations X 933 and X 9_2. The
inner radial besm Caps are laterally supported, a a !
i
Three shelves are made of aluminum honeycomb and have the following
construction :
a. Fuel cell - _o inches thick with 7178-T6facesheets che_ical/y
milled to 0.020 and 0.035 inch. The core is 3/16 by 0.0015 inch. •
b. Oxygen - Two inches thick with 7075-T6 facesheets of 0.030 to
0.060 inch. The core is 3/16 by 0.003 inch.
c. Hydrogen - One and one-half inches thick with 7075-T6facesheets
of 0.015 inch." The core is 3/16by 0.0015 inch.
00000001-TSG02
47
Insulation consisting of 28 layers of O.15-mil aluminized Myle_
sandwiched between two layers of 0.50.rail aluminized Kapton is attached
to specific hey 4 surfaces with Velcro patches. The insulation is lo-
cated on the tunnel section of the fuel cell bey, on the beams, and
shelves of the cryogenic bays, and on the panel from the aft bulkhead
' to the fuel cell shelf.
4.6.2 Bay 4 Panel Structural Behavior
The bey 4 panel may be structurally idealized as a cylindrical shell
segment supported elastically at its boundaries. The radial beams pro-
vide support in the axial and radial directions along the meridians of
the panel. Tangential support along those boundaries is provided by the
adjacent shell panels which are supported by the _or_ard and aft bulkheads.
The forward and aft bulkheads provide radial and circumferential support.
The panel and radial beams have 5/16 and 9/32 inch attachment i_cles,
respectiw-.ly, with large tolerances to allow removal and reinstallation
of the petrel when the spacecraft is on the launch pad. The maximum free
movement _t a single bolt would be 0.0975 inch considering the naximum
dimensions of the hole in the panel and radial beam and the minir_um bolt
diameter.
Two simplified limiting cases may be used to describe the basic
\ structural behavior of the panel. The first considers the panel as a _
flat plate supported on all edges. In this case the panel transfers
loads to the boundary by bending. The second case considers the panel
as a pure membrane which transfers loads into attachments by in-plane
extension. The photographs of the service module show failure at the
: attachments along all the boundaries except for a small piece of struc-
ture (approximately 6 by 4 inches) in the upper left-hand corner (viewed
from the exterior). If the panel behaved as a flat plate and failed
cleanly at the attachments, the bolts would fail in tension at approxi-
mately 5100 pounds per bolt. This load oI the bolt would require a
shear load in the adjacent core of 785 pounds/inch which is greater than
3 times the core-failure load. Since no facesheet nor core is evident
along the edge, the structure did not behave as the simplified model of
a flat plate.
Because of the evidence which suggested primarily membrane behavior,
simplified representations of the structure were used to investigate its
behavior. Structural analyses were performed for numerous pressure dis-
tribution as well as for temperature gradients for both _ot and cold
inner facesheets. The results show that the peak pressure mu_t exceed
20 psi and that temperature gradients of interest result in sm_,.lledge
loads. The static allowables for failure with a failure mode cf shear
tearout are shown in figure 4-25.
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4.6.3 Cryogenic Oxygen Tank 2 Structure
The cryogenic oxygen tank is fabricated from Inconel 718 and is com-
posed of two hemispheres assembled by fusion welding. A sketch of the
tank is shown in figure 4-2_. The basic wall thickness of 0.059 inch
. with increasing thickness at the welds and boss areas. The inside radius
is 12.528 inches. The limit design pressure (maximum operating pressure)
is 1025 psi, proof pressure is 1367 psi, and design burst pressure at
ambient temperature is 1538 psi. Structural analyses have predicted a
positive margin at design conditions; burst tests using liquid nitrogen
demonstrated burst strengths in excess of 2200 psi. Preflight _._acture
mechanics analysis of cryogenic oxygen tank 2 predicted that no flaw prop-
agation would occur until a pressure of 1050 psi was reached and that the
failure mode at pressures less than 1240 would be leakage.
4.6.4 Cryogenic Oxygen Tank 2 Fracture Mechanics
Figures 4-25 and 4-26 show the fracture mechanics data of the cryo-
: genic oxygen tank. For the base material and the weld, as well as for
heat-affected zone materials, the mode of failure is leakage at pressures
up to those above proof pressure.
Cryogenic oxygen tank 2 was operating well within the fracture mec-
hanics limits for sustained flaw @Towth_ hence, neither lee_age nor rapid
fracture'would be expected due to propagation of pre-existing flaws under ....'
the influence of pressure alone. Test data indicate that the addition of
polytetrafluoroethylene combustion products to oxygen, and the irrnediate
exposure of the mixture t_ a moderately stressed flaw, generated,no de-
tectable evidence of r_pid sustained-load flaw growth.
Localized heating of the tank material is the probable mode of the
loss of tank pressure integrity and is supported by all known test analy-
s_.sand by telemetry data, Considering that only polytetrafluoroethylene
was burning in the tank, then the only place where the polytetrafluoro-
ethylene comes close to, or touches, the pressure vessel wall is in the
electrical conduit. Tests of burning insulation in the electrical con-
duit shows that in a few seconds the generated heat fails the tube. Fol-
lowing the tube failure, the pressure in the annulus region would rapidly
rise until the exterior shell burst disk (approximately 3 square inches)
would rupture at approximately 80 psia.
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Figure 4-25.- Fracture mechanicsdata for cryogenicoxygen
tank basematerial at -190 ° F.
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4.6.5 Significant Structural Events
The following interpretation and Judgement of the most probable se-
quence of events are based on all applicable data in the 0.80-second
time period prior to the loss cf data (figs. 4-27 and 4-28).
At 55:54:52.763 the last pressure data from tank 2 were recorded as
996 psia and the pressure was rapidly decreasing. The fuel cell flow-
meters were responding accordingly. Beyond the last pressure point, the
pressure can be interpreted from fuel cell flow rates (fig. 4-28). Note
the flow rates gradually decreased and then started to increase slightly.
This can be interpreted to mean that the relief valve closed or that the
burning rate increased.
The data at the following times are interpreted to be the first loss
of pressure system integrity, and the vibration experienced during this
time period is interpreted to be due to venting of the tank through the
vacuum annulus.
a. At 55:54:53.182 command module accelerations in the X, Y, and Z
axes indicated response of less than 0.Sg, 0.1g, and 0.256 peak to peak,
respectively, with an estimated frequency of 15 to 25 hertz.
b. At 55:54:53.204 the stabilization and control thrust vector con-
trol command in pitch and yaw indicates an oscillation of approximately .
18 to 20 hertz, which is increasing with time. The results of full-
scale testing of the docked command and service modules and lunar module
to determine guidance and navigation transfer function were reviewed, as
were the analytical mode shapes. These data revealed a mode at 18.76
hertz which exhibited the characteristic of motion in the area of the
oxygen tank and rotational displacement at the rate gyros. Assuming
i percent critical damping, the minimum harmonic forcing function was
calculated to be 325 pounds at 18.76 hertz. The analysis shows that a
forced vibration was present during this period.
c. At 55"54:53.271 the flow rate to the fuel cells reached a peak
value. Based on the last pressure reading and the integration of the
• flow rates, the oxygen tank pressure at this time is estizuated to have ,
been less than 996 psia.
I
d. The next data from the fuel cell flow rate show a decrease, and
be interpreted as a change in the venting area from the initial indi- imay
cation of a leak. However, changes in the hydrogen flow meters at the
same time place doubt on the meaning of the dropoff. Such a decrease _
could come from increased oxygen flow because of expulsion of the wiring
z'romthe controlling area or an extension of the original leak are,A due
to increasing temperature. 1
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Figure 4-28.- Accelerationsandfuel cell flowratesduringperiodof incident.
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Based on spacecraft current data measured at 55:54:53.472, the
heaters did not come on and tank 2 pressure was above 878 psia, the
heater-on point.
At 55:54:53.511, the command modulc X-axis accelerometer indicated
minus 0.56g (fig. 4-27). This is interpreted as the start of the rapid
presst_rization of the bay. The Y and Z axis accelerometers responded
20 milliseconds later.
At 55:54:53.555, the data loss began. Based upon the damage noted
in the photographs, this is interpreted as an impact by the separated
bay 4 panel on the antenna.
a. The panel was subjected to a rapid overpressurization. To be
consistent with the structural mechanics, the available strength, and
the observed evidence, the peak pressures are estimated to have exceeded
20 psi.
b. An analysis of the kinematics and dynamics of the panel was per-
/ formed. It was assumed that the panel failed very quickly and that con-
tact of the panel and the high-gain antenna was limited to the damage
observed to only one of the antenna dishes. The position of the antenna
is sh wn in figure 4-29. The results of this analysis determine a re-
_ quired axis of rotation of the panel (fig. 4-23). Assuming a constant
. location of the line of action of the applied force, an approximate center
of pressure can be located.
r,
" c. The foregoing analysis is consistent with the available strength
(fig. 4-23). The axis of rotation required to satisfy the kinematics of
panel separation, the available strength, and the photographic evidence
support the origin of failure on the left side of the panel as viewed
from the exterior. The response of the Y and Z axes accelerometers noted
at 55:54:53.531 is consistent with a minus Y and minus Z force applied
over 15 to 20 milliseconds. Analysis of the vehicle dynamics indicates
a 900 to 1500 lb-sec impulse was experienced by the spacecraft. Suck an
impulse would require an initial total force greater than 60 000 pounds.
The variation in strength with a failure mode of shear tearout in the
' panel is shown for loads applied perpendicular to the boundary. The
allowable load applied parallel to the boundary is bounded by shear of
the fastener at approximately 2200 lb/in.
Evidence of pressure and heat in the bay is indicated from the re-
sponse of the temperature measurements discussed in _Ject_on g.7. The
response of a measurement located on the outboard side of the oxidizer
storage tank in bay 3 confirms failure of the web of radial beam 3.
Damage to the beam caused the shifting of the fuel cell shelf.
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Separation of the panel induced high shock loads to the service
module as the attachments failed along the boundary and at the bay 4
shelves. This shock closed the reactant valves in the fuel cell oxygen
system, as well as several reaction control propellant isolation valves.
!
Either the tank2 feedline or the pressure transducer wiring or
plumbing was severed during the loss of data. This explains the zero
reading of low scale on tank 2 when data were recovered at 55:54:55.763.
Figure 4-30 shows the plumbing and Wiring on the oxygen shelf which were
functional following data recovery. Th._figure alr_o_hows the location
of the electrical leads to tm_k i. After the event, the quantity and
temperature sensing systems, heaters, an(Afans operated. The operation
of these circuits and the location of the wire bundle of tank i with re-
spect to tank 2 suggests there was no electrical damage associated with
the loss of tank 2 pressure. Further, the motor-operated switch box
through which all heater power goes for both tanks was still perative.
4.7 THERMAL EFFECTS ON SERVICE MODULE
Prior to the incident, all temperature transducers responded as ex-
pected. At the time of the incident the following measurements
(fig. 4-31) indicated abnormal temperature responses:
(a) Bay 3 oxia_zer storage tank surface
(b) Service propulsion helium supply llne on bay 3 side of beam 3
at the inner edge of the beam
(c) Bay 3 reaction control quad C helium tank
(d) Fuel cell radii.tot_lycol outlet lines on beam 4 in bay 4
(e) Fuel cell radiator glycol inlet lines or beam 4 in bay &.
The bay 3 oxidizer tank surfac_ temperature increased from 73.4°
to 77.7° F in about 20 seconds (fig. 4-32). The temperature then de-
creased to 60° F about 2-1/4 hours later. Data received during the two
command and service'module power-up cycles at 101:55.54 and 123:05:25
showed 60° and 65.3° F, respectively. The rise rate of bay 3 service
propulsion system oxidizer surface temperature is indicative of direct
heating in the vicinity of the transducer, which is attached to the tank
skin and covered with 30 layers of insulation.
Heat inputs to the bay 3 service propulsion tank surface trsnsducer
depend on the thermal integrity of the multilayer insulation blanket
covering the transducer. To obtain the noted response requires severely
degraded insulation, probably because of burning of the insulation or
pressurization of the bay wi+.hhot gas.
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The service propulsion helium line temperature (fig. 4-32) increased
from 84.6 ° to 89° F in about 37 seconl_. In 2 more minutes, the tempera-
ture had increased to 92.2 ° F. A gradual cooling trend followed, and_
i0 minutes later, the temperature had decreased to 83.4° F. During the
two command and service module power-up cycles at 101:55:54 and 123:05:19,
, the helium line temperatures were 72.1 ° and 65.9 ° F, respectively. The
initial rise rate is again indicative of direct heating in the vicinity
of the transducer. However, unlike the oxidizer tank surface temperature,
the gradual decrease in helium line temperature, after the initial rise,
is indicative of a cool-down response to radiant heat loss. The helium
line cooled gradually because of the lower temperature levels with the
fuel cells shut down and the bay 4 panel missing.
Bay 3 reaction control qaad C helium tank temperature (fig. 4-29)
rose from 79.7 ° to 81° F in about l0 seconds. The temperature continued
to rise to approximately 83° F about 5 minutes later, th:n it gradually
decreased to 81.6 ° F.
Although all fuel cell radiator glycol inlet and out!_t temperatures
showed perturbatlons, the fuel cell 3 radiator inlet temperature s exhibit-
ed the largest response. The temperature increased from 93.1 ° to 97.4 ° F
in 3 seconds or less. This represents the highest response rate noted
from any of the transducers at the time of the incident. The data for
fuel mall 3 radiator__inlet temperature, and for other transducers, are
shown in figure 4-33. A correlation of these data has been performed and
it is concluded that these trausducers could have been exposed to a sud-
den change in temperature environment prior to the data loss. An extrapo- /"
lation can be made which would sup_ _rt the response noted at the time of
the heat pulse (fig. h-33), but it would depend on the heat input function.
Tests performed w-ith the temperature sensor installed on the glycol line
and with glycol flowing indicate that the heat pulse would lead the rise
point by about 0.25 second. The rise point can reasonably be extended to
any time during the data loss• Assuming the rise point started at the
time of the data loss, then the heat pulse would have started at approxi-
mately the same time as the accelerometer disturbances, indicating that
the high heating rate started before the bay 4 panel separated. The data
indicate that the high-heatlng environment extended throughout bays 3 and
4.
4.8 SPACECRAFT DYNAMIC RESPONSE _
,I
At the time of the incident, spacecraft attitude ,:ontrol was being
providedby the digital autopilot in the primary guidance, navigation,
and control system. At 55:51:23 an automatic maneuver had been initiated _
to the attitude specified for observation of the Bennet Comet, and the
spacecraft was rolling at 0.2 degree/second. All reaction control system
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quads were enabled for pitch and yaw and quads A and C for roll. No _n-
glnes were firing at the time of the incident. All guidance and control
system equipment was powered up except the optics.
The stabilization and control system recorded the small body rate
, oscillations described in section 4.6, at 0.28 second before the loss of
data. When data were regained, negative rates were present in all three
axes (fig. 4-34). The oscillations shown in the pitch and yaw axes on
the figure are predominantly due to excitation of the first bending mode
(2.7 hertz). The reaction control engine firings which occurred following
resumption of data were proper for the conditions that existed. The re-
sulting angular accelerations in pitch and roll, however, indicate that
only one thruster was acting in each axis and that quad C was inoperative.
The total attitude change was small (fig. 4-35).
The loss of data precludes an accurate estimation of the character
of the torque applied; however, the net change in angular kinetic energy
was approximately 90 ft-lb.
The inertial measurement unit accelerometers recorded a net velocity .
change of 0.4 ft/sec, predomlnantlE in the vehicle Y-Z plane. An accurate
assessment of the direction of the force cannot be made because the mag-
nitude is at the one or two data bit level (0.18 ft/sec/bit). Assuming,
however, that the measured velocity change was accurate and that thruster
firings did not degrade the measurement, the net change in translational
kinetic energy was approximately 250 ft-lb.
Venting followed the incident and attitude control was maintained
automatically by the digital autopilot until the loss of main bus B when
the last minus pitch thruster was disabled. Periodic attempts were made
to reestablish attitude control manually using the thruster emergency
coils until the thrusters were reconfigured to main A. The venting dis-
turbance torque is shown in figure 4-36. Figure 4-37 contains a time
history of network doppler data and shows the effect of venting as well
as uncoupled thruster firings.
4.9 LOSS OF TELEMETRY DATA _
i
Prior to the incident, the spacecraft was transmitting and receiving
the S-band signals through the high-gain antenna, which was operating in
the auto-track and narrow beam mode. Immediately before the incident, '_
the high-gain antenna was pointing along the line-of-sight shown in
figure 4-29.
At 55:54:53.57 all ground station receivers lost phase lock because ,_
I of a sudden interruption of the si al. Two w hase loc
gn - ay p k was regained
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• at 55:54:54.12. As shown in figure 4-29, the received carrier power ir_-
creased to a level consistent with receipt of good quality high bit rate
telemetry data through the Goldstone 210-foot antenna at 55:54:55.37.
The data indicate that the interruption of signal was caused by the
, physical damage to one of the four high-gain antenna dishes requireA for
- the narrow beam mode. The data also indicate that the high-gain antenna
automatically switched to the wide beam mode.
4.10 LOSS OF FUEL CELL PERFORMANCE
Three fUel cells are located in bay 4 of the service module
(fig. 3-2). Each fuel cell consists of a cell stack, hydrogen and oxygen
control systems, a water removal system, and a thermal control and heat
rejection system (fig. 4-38).
Following the incident, the fuel cell 1 regulated nitrogen pressure
indication was at the lower limit of the measurement. The nitrogen regu-
lator is internally referenced to vacuum and maintains an absolute level
of the nitrogen gas over the fUll range of fUel cell operating conditions
The regulator vents downstream pressure to maintain control of overpres-
sure. The oxygen and hydrogen regulated pressures, which are referenced _
to the nitrogen system pressure, remained normal after the loss of indi-
cated nitrogen pressure, confirming that proper nitrogen pressure was
maintained by the regulator. Consequently, there was a loss of the in- Y'
strumentation during the data dropout period.
About 2.5 minutes after the loss of pressure in cryogenic oxygen
tank 2, the regulated oxygen pressures for fuel cells 1 and 3 decreased
to nitrogen system pressure levels such that these fuel cells could no
longer support a load.
The oxygen and hydrogen regulators are similar in operation to the
nitrogen regulator. The regulators maintain the reactant pressure at a
constant level above the nitrogen reference pressure over the full range
of gas consumption -- from zero flow to full power operation plus purge. ,
The oxygen and hydrogen pressure must be maintained at a minimum of 2 psi
above the nitrogen reference pressure to prevent the electrolyte solution
(aqueous potassium hydroxide) from crossing the electrode interface
(fig. 4-39) and causing loss of fuel cell performance. Figure 4-40 shows
the pressure decay at which point the fuel cells were flooded, causing a
subsequent loss of performance.
The pressure decays on fUel cells i and 3 were caused by closure of
the fuel cell oxygen reactant shutoff valves. When the valves closed, a
volume of high pressure oxygen was trapped between the reactant valves i
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and the fuel cell oxygen regulators. This oxygen _as sufficient for fuel
cell operation for about 2.5 minutes, the time required to deplete the
trapped supply. The agreement between the calculated and actual operat-
ing time after valve closure (fig. 4-40) verifies that fuel cells i and
3 were starved of oxygen and eventually could not suppo_'te_nelectrical
load.
Impact tests on the oxygen solenoid valves (fig. 4-41) show that a
shock in excess of 86g for ii millis.econdsduration can be expected to
cause valve closure under operating conditions.
The presence of a shock is further verified by the fact that the
service module reaction control valves on quad C were closed. These
valves can be switched closed at levels,of 80g in i0 milliseconds.
Flight experience has frequently shown a closure of one or two of the
reaction controlisolation valves when the service module is separated
from the adapter panels; an explosive charge is Used to sever the skin
attachment.
The crew did not receive an indication oi'the shock closure of the
solenoid valves since the hydrogen and.oxygen solenoid valve "talkback"
indicators are electrically connected in series for each fuel cell. The "'
detection system, therefore, will show "barberpole" only when both the
hydrogen and oxygen valves are closed for a fuel cell and not for closure
of either valve.
Fuel cell 2 performance was normal before and immediately after the
period of data loss. When fuel cells 1 and 3 were removed from the buses,
fuel cell 2 assumed the total spacecraft electrical power load of approxi-
mately 60 amperes. Fuel cell 2 continued to operate normally until approx-
imately 57 hours 46 minutes when the oxygen tank i pressure dec_yed to
below the required inlet pressure of the fu_l cell oxygen regulator. The
oxygen regulated pressure then dropped to the nitrogen pressure level where
the fuel cell could no longer sustain the load and was removed from the
bus. The failure mode was identical to that experienced by fuel cells i
and 3.
• Three caution and warning alarms for fuel cell 2 hydrogen high flow
rate occurred at about 56 hours and were caused by fuel cell 2 supporting
the high power loads, which exceeded the 0.1617 pound per hour alarm trip
level for hydrogsn flow.
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4.11 FAILURE MECHANISM l
A large number of postulated mechanisms were examined, and the scope
of the review is reflected in table 4-II. Many of the potential mechan-
isms were quickly eliminated by comparing the end result, or the reaction
rate produced by the mechanism, against the observed flight data. Others
were eliminated on the basis of data from the literature or from tests
that showed the mechanism to be a second or higher order effect. Of the
mechanisms listed in the table as "possible," the one that satisfies the
flight data is initiation of combustion in the tank by electrical shorts.
The association of fan energization, the electrical shorts at the start
of pressure rlse, and the availability of sufficient electrical energy
in the fan circuit to cause ignition of the polytetrafluoroethylene led
to the fan motors and power leads being the most likely point of ignition.
Electrical power for the fans, heaters, and quantity probe system is
provided through a 24-pin electrical connector, which is the electrical
and mechanical interface with the cryogenic oxygen volume. Seventeen -
wires and the shielded cable are soldered to the connector, and these
wires extend through approximately 32 inches of conduit coiled in the
upper cap of the vacuum Jacket and enter the pressure vessel through the
boss about 5 inches from the temperature sensor. The conduit is made
of Inconel X-750 (A_ 5582). Each wire is insulated with color-coded
polytetrafluoroethylene insulation about i0 mils thick. Table h-III ....._
lists the materials in the connector and conduit. In addition, the wire
bundles for various systems are enclosed in heat-shrlnkable type poly-
tetrafluoroethylene sleeving (0.012 inch thick). A total of about 0.1
pound of polytetrafluoroethylene insulation is present in the electrical
connector and conduit and when totally combusted would yield about
195 Btu of energy.
The fan wiring leads consist of two harnesses of four wires each for
the two 3-phase fan motors. Wires (MIL-W-16878, type E) are 26-gage
nickel and are coated with 0.010-inch polytetrazi_oroethylene insulation.
Also, each harness of four wires is covered in some regions with a poly-
tetrafluoroethylene sleeve of approximately 0.012-inch thickness. Wire
runs of the two fan harnesses are as indicated in figure _-42 and are
identical, except that the lower fan harness is routed through a tube in
the heater assembly.
The fan motor power leads internal to, and near, the heater assembly
are extremely vulnerable to heat damage in abnormal operations. This has
been demonstrated dramatically in a test employing approximately 8 hours
of continuous heater operation. The insulation degradation caused in a
test simulating the detanking cycle used on o_gen tank 2, (discussed in
section 5.0) is seen in pictures of the wiring which failed (fig. 4-43).
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TABLE 4-II.- INITIATION MECHANISMS
Mechanism Significant Data I Assessment a
l i
Fan Motor Assembly and Leads (Electrical)
Ohmic heating of field coils Ignition unlikely based on low pressure U_likely
(stalled rotor) i g test data and low power input (30
watts total per motor).
Continuous shorts (in leads Ignition possible based on hot wire Possible
or coil) ignition test data. Can get i to 2 amps
through fuse.
Intermittent shorts (in leads Sufficient energy available from inverter Possible
or coil or to housing) to ignite insulation (North American
Rockwell and Manned Spacecraft Center
test).
Fabrication and assembly Both motors passed preflight room tern- Unlikely
error perature tests August 1966. Would require
degradation and failure after extended
period of normal usage. Data included
elsewhere in the report.
Fan Motor Assembly and Leads (Mechanical)
Loss of fan parts at high RPM Loss of fan unlikely (self-locking nut Unlikely
(impact or friction ignition) end square shaft). Parts considered as
contaminants.
Overheated bearing ignites Ignition temperature 463 ° C at 2000 psi Unlikely
Rulon A retainer gaseou2 oxygen.
Low ener_ source (motor torque 0.9 in-oz. )
limits energy input into bearing. When
bearing seizes, becomes stalled rotor
(covered separately).
Rotor or fan blade co_tacting Ignition of aluminum possible. Unlikely
adjacent structure (friction
Preflight checkout showed no problem.ignition ) /
No cause for occurrence in flight.
Heater and Controls (Electrical)
Element shorted to sheath Heater not powered 'at time of incident. Unlikely
Heater operation normal in both tanks !
prior to tank incident (cryogenic data), i
Leads shorted to ground Heaters not powered at time of origin Unlikely t
Intermittent shorts (sparkir_) of incident. (Verified by detailed
review of current tank pressure data. ) i
i
i
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TABLE 4-II.- INITIATION MECHANISMS - Continued
, Mechanism Significant Data Assessment a
Heater and Controls (Electrical) - Continued
m
Inadvertent operation of heater Flight data (current) volts_e shows Unlikely
no indication of inadvertent operation.
Inadvertent operation would not account
for energy release in tank unless com-
bined with chemical reaction.
Oxygen in thermal switch Previous operation normal and switch Unlikely
(ignited by spark or impact) in closed position at time of event.
Heater and Controls (Mechanical)
Impact Requires impact or energy source from Unlikely
Friction some other event.
Shock wave
Material yielding No failure or loading mechanism in Unlikely
this time period which can he explained
Fracture by flight data.
Quantity Gage Assembly (Electrical)
Short between plates, and Off scale data could confirm short Unlikely
between plates and ground between plates. .."_"
Maximum power input less than 7.35
ml lliJoules
Insufficient data on energy required
to ignite insulation.
No correlation with flight voltage
transients.
RF heating Insufficient energy input. Analyzed Unlikely
by North American Rockwell to he
350 nanowatts maximum.
Quantity gage plate lead No power to heater (not on) confirmed Unlikely
short to heater lead by main bus current data.
Maximum power input less than 7.35
milliJoules from probe.
Insufficient data on energy required
to ignite.
Temperature transducer short Flight data indicate normal function Unlikely
after initial pressure rise in tank 2.
Maximum energy input is less than
microJoules.
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TABLE 4-II,- INITIATION MECHANIS_ - Continued
Mechanism Signi_ cant Data Assessmenta
Quantity Gage _semb_7 (Mechanical)
I
Impact Requires prior event, nct associated , Unlikely
Friction with gage, for energy so,Arce.
Shock wave
Yielding No loading mechanism. Unlikely
Fracture Consistent with dat_,,.
Pressure Vessel (Electrical)
Ohmic heating to produce No suste_ned high currents, low power, Unlikely
overpressure Heater and fan leads could touch vessel.
Heater leads not powered.
Spark discharge to pressure Same as above. Unlikely
vessel __
Pressure Vessel (Mechanical)
Impact Impact source not identified. Unlikely
Friction Friction source not identified. Unlikely
Fracture Vessel intact after event initiation. Unlikely
Yielding Below yield stress when event initiated. Unlikely ""'
Shock wave Shock source not identified. Unlikely
Vacuum Jacket end Associated Equipment (Electricel)
Ohmic heating of vacuum Jacket No internal current sources except Unlikely
or pressure vessel vac-ion pump.
No continuous high current_, no indi-
cation of external arcin6 possibility.
Vao-ion pump failure resulting Requires oxygen leakage from tan_ to Unlikely
in sparking end ignition of cause difficulty. Van-ion pump turned
material off prior to launch.
• Vacuum Jacket and Associated Equipment (Mechanical)
Impact Oxygen required, not available unless Unlikely
Friction leak or failure occurred.
Fracture
Yielding
Flow from prpssure vessel Long exposure of Mylar to liquid oxygen Possible
leak causing ignition of increases its impact sensitivity and de-
aluminized Mylar gree of reactivity. Impact threshold level
decreases end the reactivity progresses
from charring to the exposive state.
Aluminized Mylar unacceptable in liquid
oxygen impact.
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TABLE 4-II,- INITIATION MECHANISMS - Concluded
i
Mechanism Significant Data Assessment a
Other Possible Causes
Fo.'eignmaterial in tank
a. Lubricant and glass beads Found on ground support equipment filter Possible
after first pad fill.
b. Rivet or rivet pin Oversize rivet hole in quantity gage.
c. Quantity gage button Flow stoppage during detanking.
spacers
d. Inadvertent substitu- Identical size and shape parts for o_gen
tion of titanium for tank and hydrogen tank. Same basic part
steel number, dash number different.
e. Broken safety wire Twisted wire on Beech motors -,_dfilter.
Tank electrical connector AC current anomalies could be related. Possible
failure. (Bad connection Wire insulation is available fuel. -
resulting in spark ignition. )
Ionization due to cosmic radi- Solar events which occurred during flight Unlikely ....
ation (resulting in spark dis- were after the event. Very high voltage
charge at quantity probe), required for dielectric breakdown of gas.
Gaseous fuels (such as hydrogen) Nutrients not available. Metabol_c rate Unlikely
produced by metabolism of micro- near zero at low temperature. Aerobic -,,
organisms species are not known which produce oxi-
dizable products.
Triboelectric charging of tank Tank and shell are at vehicle potential. Unlikely
interior causing spark ignition
External plumbing problems Liquid oxygen flowing over pressure trans- Unlikely
ducer can cause apparent pressure increase.
Temperature flight date and probe behavior
cannot he explained. _3_yblow-out ques-
tionable,
i
%_ikely: Energy source unlikely to produce observed flight data.
Possible: Energy source possibly could produce flight data-detailed analy_i_ performed.
- t
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TABLE 4-111.- MATERIALS IN CONNECTOR AND CONDUIT
I
Service Number Wire size
of wires (AWG) . Material
Heater 4 20 Silver plated copper, polytetra-
fluoroethylene insulated
Quantity probe 1 20 Nickel - polytetrafluoroethylene
insulated (outer probe)
1 20 Nickel - polytetrafluoroethylene
insulated (inner probe)
Temperature 4 22 Nickel - polytetrafluoroethylene
sensor insulated
Motors 8 26 Nickel - polytetrafluoroethylene
insulated
Sleeve Heat shrinkable polytetrafluoro-
ethylene tubing _!
Connector Inconel with gold plated pins
Solder 60 percent tin, 40 percent lead
!
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This test showed that insulation will be severely damaged by the abnormal
heater operation so that numerous locations for electrical shorts or arcs
are available when the fan circuits are powered.
By this mechanism, an arc ignition could occur in these leads. The
maximum electrical energy available in the f_n motor wiring during the
first shor_ is about 160 Joules. Tests confirm that the ignition energies
of this material by a spark source is less than 1 Joule. The rate of prop-
agation has been shown by test to be greatly affected by flow and gravita-
tional conditions in the tank (zero-g rate is less than one-g rat_), As
a result, it is difficult to assess actual propagation at the time of the
failure. _he 14-second plateau in'the pressure-time flight data could be
due to partial blocking or slowing of the flame front as the flame propa-
gates to a grommet and must penetrate a thicker, better thermally-sinked
c_ponent. Other barriers to propagation are also possible.
The total energy available from complete combustion of the wire in-
sulation was determined by estimating the weight of the wire insulation
and sleeve material and using literature data on the heat of combustion
of polytetrafluoroethylene (2100 to 2200 Btu/ib). These estimates are --
summarized in table 4-IV, Combustion of wire insulation will furnish
sufficient thermal energy for the process requiring minimum energy for
the tank pressure increase as described in section 4.3.
Tests have shown flame propagation into the conduit region will
cause rapid degradation and failure of pressure integrity. It is also ,,
significant that this is the only region where the wire insulation comes
in close proximity to the pressure shell. A test has shown that ignition
of the wire insulation at the electrical connector end resulted in very
rapid failure of the conduit with little pressure or temperature response •
back in the simulated pressure vessel. A test with ignition outside the
conduit and propagation along wire insulation into the conduit caused
very rapid failure of the conduit. Additionally, a "torch" effect en-
larged the opening as a result of melting or burning of the metal in the
conduit tank interior region. This latter effect could explain the rapid
lobs of pressure from tank 2 as well as other higher order effects.
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TABLE 4-IV.- HEAT AVAILABLEFROM WIRE INSULATION
, Heat available
Location from wire insulation
(Btu)
Zone i* 195
Zone 2** 38.6
Zone 3"** 34.4
*Zone i - Wire insulation in conduit from connector to tank-
conduit interface.
**Zone 2 - Wire insulation from tank-conduit interface to lowest
portion of upper polytetrafluoroethylene - 25 percent glass probe
insulator.
***Zone 3 - All other wire insulation.
,.,.,,j.
/
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5.0 PREFLIGHT CONTRIBUTING EFFECTS
A comprehensive review of the history of cryogenic oxygen tank 2
, was made to determine whether an unfavorable condition could have existed
prior to launch. This review included test records, materials review
dispositions, and failure reports. No positive indication of any un-
favorable conditions prior to _hipment could be found in the testing or
inspections conducted. However, an abnormal condition was found in the
prelaunch detanking procedure which is discussed in 5.1.
In addition to the review discussed, a special review and demonstra-
tion.of the assembly methods used to install the wiring, fans, heater
assembly, and quantity probe was made by the vendor for this investiga-
tion. The installation procedures for the heater, fan, and probe wiring
were found to be critical for several areas where routing damage would not
be visible on the assembled product. However, this condition most likely
did not contribute to the ultimate loss of the tank pressure in flight.
A detailed asses.Qmentwas also made of the incident where the oxygen
shelf hoist assembly failed during the factory removal of the tank shelf
from the Apollo l0 spacecraft (fig. 5-1). Analysis end test show that the
maximum shock upward would be about 7 g's, and the maximum shock downward
would be about 15 g's. Analytically, the components within the tank would
be expected to withstand 100 g's shock. Consequently, this condition is
not believed to have contributed to the ultimate failure of the tank in ....._
flight.
The condition which most probably led to the failure, occurred dur-
ing the special detanking procedures used after the countdown demonstra-
tion test.
The cryogenic oxygen tank 2 could not be off loaded after the initial
filling during the countdown demonstration test using the normal procedures.
The problem resulted from loose or misaligned plumbing components in the
dog-leg portion of the tank fill path (fig. 5-2). Allowable manufacturing
tolerances are such that the tank mr_ynot be detanked normally under these
• conditions. A test has verified this fact. _he condition of loose plumb-
ing in the probe assembly, which existed in the tank before the detanking,
was Judged to be safe for _light in every aspect.
After numerous attempts with gaseous oxygen purges and higher expul-
sion pressures in en attempt to remove the fluid, the fluid was boiled
off through the use of tank heaters and fans, assisted by pressure cycling.
The sequence of detanking is shown in figures 5-3 and 5-4. The heater-on
time was about 8 hours. It was thought that no damage would be sustained
by the tank or its components because of the protection afforded by the
internal thermal switches.
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The thermal switches, which normally open at about 80° F, show no
sign of operation from the heater voltage data. Inflight, these switches
have not operated due to the temperatures in the tank. Further, the
switches in the past have not operated uuder a load on the ground, and
' they were not designed or tested for this condition.
In the case of Apollo 13, the u_ of the heaters to assist in detank-
ing required the switches to opeu under load. This is the first time the
switches were operated with 65 V dc and 6 amperes which is twice the nor-
real flight operating conditions for each heater. Tests show that opening
the switches under these ground power conditions will fuse the contacts
closed at the instant of power interruption (fig. 5-5). Tests have veri-
fied that when the heaters are on for the duration experieced during pre-
launch operations (approximately 8 hours ), the fan motor wire insulation
is severely degraded (fig. _-43).
Wiring can be damaged within a couple of hours, with the heaters
being "on" continuously as evidenced by the temperature on the heater
assembly (figs. 5-6 and 5-7). "'
/
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6.0 CONCLUSIONS
The analysis of the data and results of special tests associated
with the incident leads to the following conclusions.
#
I
1. The detanking problem which occurred during the countdown demon-
stration test resulted from loose or misaligned fill-line plumbing compo-
nents within the tank. This condition was not the direct cause of the
• anomaly, but did result in the use of a special detanking procedure fol-
lowing the countdown demonstration test.
2. Both heater thermal switches failed closed from heater operation
during the special detanking. The failed switches allowed continuous
heater power to be applied, and led to severe damage of the insulation
on the power wires leading to a fan motor.
3. The failure of the thermal switches was caused by an incompati-
bility between the capacity of the switches and the voltage used from the
ground power supply.
4. A fire was started by electrical short-circuits in.the wiring to
the fan motors inside oxygen tank 2 shortly after the fan circuits were
energized for the seventh time.
5. Burning of the insulation proceeded for about 80 seconds before
reaching the pressure vessel electrical conduit; through which all elec-
trical tank wiring passes. The heat of the burning caused failure of the
Inconel conduit first, and ultimately led to the failure of the vacuum
dome and separation of the bay h structural panel.
6. The internal component design of the tank lends itself to pos-
sible damage which can go undetected. Further, the plumbing parts have
_olerance allowables which can build up to prevent normal detanking.
7. The design of the warning system for indicating the position of
the reactant valves to the fuel cells does not allow detection of indi-
vidual valve closures to any fuel cell, a condition which existed during
• this incident.
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